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SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE NATIONAL HOUSING 
PROGRAMME: AFFORDABLE HOMES OR POLITICAL 
GAIN?
RÉSUMÉ 
Même en l’absence d’un article constitutionnel citant le droit à un 
logement sufisant – introduit pour la première fois dans la constitu-
tion de 2012 – le gouvernement Egyptien a pris la responsabilité de 
construire des logements à loyer modéré (subventionnés), représentant 
le tiers des constructions de logements pendant l’âge d’or du gouver-
nement (Banque Mondiale 2007).
Mais malgré les milliards prélevés sur les fonds publics et investis 
par le gouvernement dans ces programmes, des centaines de milliers 
de citoyens ont risqué leurs vies dans les rues, pour renverser le régime 
Moubarak, début 2011. La plupart d’entre eux avaient pour but des 
demandes sociales non-satisfaites. Si ces fonds investis dans les pro-
grammes immobiliers publics n’ont pas atteint leurs buts annoncés, 
existait-t-il des buts non avoués, qui auraient été atteints ?
Le présent article fait l’évaluation du programme le plus récem-
ment « achevé », le Programme National pour le Logement ou «Iskan 
Moubarak» (2005 à 2012), à la lumière des antécédents de clientélisme 
pour lequel les régimes post-Initah sont réputés. On utilise pour cela 
des paramètres pragmatiques tels les sept critères du logement sufisant 
cités par le Pacte International relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux 
et culturels (CESCR Article 11 et observation générale no. 4/1991), et 
ceci pour évaluer si le PNL était véritablement destiné aux pauvres, 
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ou s’il n’était qu’un autre projet post-moderne, conçu pour duper, et 
si son importance pour le régime réside davantage dans l’effort de le 
commencer plutôt que dans son achèvement. (Deputy, 2011).
MOTS CLÉS :
Logements sociaux, Droit au logement, Moubarak, post-modernité, 
Clientélisme.
ABSTRACT
Even in the absence of a constitutional article declaring the right 
to adequate housing – irst introduced in the 2012 constitution – the 
Government of Egypt has taken it upon itself to build subsidised hou-
sing, which has made up nearly a third of all housing production in its 
heyday (World Bank 2007). 
But despite the billions in public funds spent on such programmes, 
hundreds of thousands of people risked their lives to overthrow the 
Mubarak regime in early 2011, mostly on grounds of unmet social 
goals. If these large investments in public housing programmes did not 
achieve their advertised social goals, were there other unadvertised 
goals that they did achieve? 
This paper assess the most recently “completed” programme, the 
National Housing Programme (NHP), or “Iskan Mubarak” ( 2005 
to 2012), in light of the track record of clientelism that post Initah 
regimes have been known for, using pragmatic parameters such as the 
International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ seven 
mandates on adequate housing (ICESR Article 11 and general com-
ment no. 4/1991), to ind out whether the NHP was indeed meant for 
the poor, or if it was another large High Modernist project ‘designed 
to deceive’, where its importance for the regime lay more in starting it 
rather than in completing it (Deputy 2011). 
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Eeven in the absence of a constitutional decree stating that adequate housing is a right to all Egyptians, up until the 2012 constitution the Government of Egypt has taken it upon itself 
to build subsidised housing, where, over the decades, various social 
housing programmes made up nearly a third of all housing production 
in urban areas.1 
Given the dire state of the built environment in Egypt where millions 
of families lack adequate housing,2 and despite the billions in public 
funds spent on subsidised housing programmes, hundreds of thousands 
of people risked their lives to overthrow the Mubarak regime in early 
2011, mostly on grounds of unmet social goals. If these large investments 
in public housing programmes did not achieve their advertised social 
goals, were there other unadvertised goals that they did achieve? 
The most recently “completed” programme – because housing 
projects rarely meet their targets – was the National Housing 
Programme (NHP), or “Iskan Mubarak”. It spanned the period of 
2005 to 2012, straddling the last years of the Mubarak regime, and 
continued throughout the transitional period that came in the wake 
of the January 25th Revolution. In this essay I aim to assess the NHP 
in light of the track record of clientelism and patrimonialism that post 
Initah regimes have been known for. If the NHP was indeed meant 
for the low-income families, there are certain pragmatic parameters it 
should have followed, if not, then it joins other large High Modernist 
projects as being ‘designed to deceive’, where their importance for the 
regime lay more in starting them rather than completing them.3
To assess this, I use three benchmarks. The irst is a macro view of 
the housing programme’s pragmatic framework, i.e. its ability to relect 
housing demands as evidenced by the number of units, tenure types, 
and geographic equity, as previous housing schemes have centred on 
the Greater Cairo region, while supply-side projects have rarely helped 
1. Between 1986 and 1996 the public sector built 29.5 per cent of all urban 
housing (not necessarily all subsidised), or 47.5 per cent of the formally built 
housing, (World Bank 2007).
2. Adequate housing being deined by article 11 of the International 
Covenant Committee on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
and the subsequent comment 4/1991.
3. As evidenced in this thorough analysis of the Toshka project, the most 
recent of the so-called National Projects (Deputy 2011).
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ease housing needs. The second benchmark looks in more detail at 
the adequacy of the housing units themselves, where the International 
Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) sets seven 
mandates,4 of which security of tenure, affordability, and habitability 
are important if the housing provided by these programmes is of any 
real use for its potential beneiciaries. The third aspect to be assessed 
is implementation, as there is a history of incomplete projects, and at 
a projected rate of roughly 80,000 units a year, this is by far the most 
ambitious public housing scheme attempted in Egypt.
BACKGROUND
Clientelism and public housing in Egypt
It is argued that authoritarian regimes have built rational-legal systems 
on deep foundations of patrimonial rule, where systems of proxy rule 
by middlemen such as the Caciquismo in Mexico, the Marabouts in 
Senegal, or Bossism in the Philippines, (re)distribute government aid 
in return for the people’s support of the regime.5 Indeed Egypt is no 
stranger to clientelism, where a culture of wasta and mahsubeyya, 
literally middlemen and favouritism, pervades in everything from the 
rigging of school grades, job placement – mostly in the public sector, 
but also in the private sector–, to the winning of contracts in supposedly 
open tenders. 
When it comes to elections, many voters, especially the poor and 
illiterate, have come to expect something material in exchange for 
their vote, whether on election day, in the form of cheap rice bags and 
cooking oil, or, much more expensive items such as infrastructure or 
housing that are promised in the run-up to elections.6 These different 
favours are usually disguised as subsidies, where a system of ‘devolved 
patronage’ has managed to dominate government functions, and at one 
point, exhaust its coffers.7
Playing the dual role as a currency for elections while making 
the regime appear to respond to social needs, subsidised housing 
programmes have been a perennial occurrence. Over Mubarak’s three 
decades of tenure, two large national housing schemes were directly 
associated with him; Iskan Mubarak lil-Shabab, of 1996 to 2005 and 
Iskan Mubarak al-Qawmy which this paper focuses on. In addition 
4. Egypt is party to the ICESCR, with obligations to apply its mandate. 
Article 11 mandates the right to adequate housing, while the subsequent 
General comment no. 4/1991 outlines the seven basics of adequate housing.
5. (Abt Associates 2002).
6. (Blaydes 2006).
7. (Dorman 2007, 56-57).
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to that, at least one large housing scheme and two slum “upgrading” 
projects were associated with his son’s NGO, Gam’iat Geel Al-
Mustaqbal, using both public funds and donations from his business 
community, along with another three slum “upgrading” schemes 
associated with Mubarak’s wife, Suzanne, and also through her chairing 
of the Red Crescent Society NGO. The lack of transparency with which 
housing units have been distributed have been a recurring concern, 
as one needs to look no further than the supposedly open lotteries of 
potential beneiciaries, which more often than not end, or are broken 
up, in protest against the wasta and mahsubeyya by which the units are 
allegedly allocated.8
The intended plan of the NHP 
In one of his election campaign speeches, Hosni Mubarak pledged 
a subsidised housing scheme of 500,000 units for low-income 
individuals and families if he got elected in 2005.9 The emphasis here 
is on “elected”, as this was the irst time the four-term president would 
be elected, all the previous terms having been achieved by referenda. 
It is not clear why that particular number of units was chosen for Wa’ad 
Mubarak (Mubarak’s (Electoral) Promise); as evinced by the USAID 
study that helped design the programme four months after it started, 
that number would be “dificult, if not impossible” to achieve.10 
With a pledged fund of LE 7.5 billion (EUR 781 million) in subsidies, 
a strategy of seven schemes was developed, all being coordinated by an 
agency of the MoH, and where both public and private sector entities 
would implement them (ig. 1). In all, about two-thirds of the scheme 
was to be built by government agencies, while the rest would be built 
privately as Ahmed El-Maghrabi, then housing minister, emphasised 
was needed as the “government budget could not support” such a large 
number of housing units11 – even though the private sector units were 
to be built on state land where subsidised trunk infrastructure would 
be installed by the government.12 Ownership would be the dominant 
8. Press reports of some recent housing lottery protests (Al-Osbu›a Online 
2013), (Al-Osbu›a Online 2011), (Veto 2013), (Masr al-Gaidia 2010).
9. The Mortgage Law 148 of 2001 deined low-income as individual 
monthly salaries of LE 1,000, or household incomes of LE 1,500. These were 
later amended in 2008 to LE 1,500 and LE 2,500 respectively.
10. (USAID 2006) In addition, three high level studies were implemented 
by the World Bank on behalf of the Government of Egypt within the NHP time 
frame and covered: an analysis of housing production (World Bank 2007); a 
framework for housing policy reform (World Bank 2008); and recommenda-
tions speciic to the NHP (World Bank 2008).
11. (Al-Yawm al-Sabe› 2010).
12. Electricity, water, and wastewater networks installed up to the bounda-
ries of the plots, and the relevant production stations built.
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tenure option across all schemes (80 per cent), while public sector 
rental schemes would make up the rest.
The traditional public sector agencies were chosen according to their 
custodianship of the public land earmarked for development. These 
agencies included the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) – 
which takes the place of local government in New Cities through its 
city authorities, or Gihaz, and is directly afiliated, with the MoH – 
in addition to the Housing Directorates of almost all 27 governorates, 
as well as the Ministry of Religious Endowments, or Awqaf, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
The largest of the public sector schemes would be developed by 
NUCA and the governorates under the name Tamlik (ownership), with 
199,000 units covering 40 per cent of the NHP. A smaller ownership 
scheme by the governorates composed of village houses (Qura al 
Dthahir al-Saharawy, or Al-Beit al-Badawy) would comprise 8,000 
units (1.6 per cent). There would be three rental schemes comprising 
21 per cent of the NHP: the Al-Igar, 26,000 units, built by al-Awqaf 
and the governorates; Beit al’Aaela, 3,000 units, built by al-Awqaf and 
a NUCA and governorate scheme of much smaller 42 m2 units; and 
the Al-Awla bil-Re’aya, of 75,000 units for those prioritised as needy, 
mainly widows, and retirees.
NHP Schemes 
Original Scheme 
10.2005 to 09.2011* 





Units % Units % 
1 Tamlik 199,000 39.8 327,141 53.8 
2 Qura al-dthahir 8,000 1.6 14,563 2.4 
3 Beit Al-'aela 3,000 0.6 3,020 0.5 
Public sector 
ownership 
Total 210,000 42.0 344,724 56.7 
4 Igar 26,000 5.2 37,807 6.2 
5 Awla bel-ri'aya 75,000 15.0 46,750 7.7 
Public sector  
rental 
Total 101,000 20.2 84,557 13.9 
Public Sector Total 311,000 62.2 429,281 70.6 
6 Ebni Beitak 89,000 17.8 93,756 15.4 
7 Mustathmirin 100,000 20.0 85,050 14.0 
Private sector 
ownership 
Total 189,000 37.8 178,806 29.4 
NHP TOTAL 500,000 100 608,087 122 
* Ministry of Housing, Utilities & Urban Development, Igazat al-iskan al-qawmy, 2009. 




Photo 1: Ebny Beitak in 6th October, Giza. Notice three storey building next 
to single storey, Y. Shawkat, december 2013.
Photo 2: Mustathmirin scheme, Haram City in 6th October, Giza. Notice 
elaborate fence and iron work, Y. Shawkat, december 2013.
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Out of two schemes developed by the private sector, the Mustathmirin 
(Investors) was to comprise 100,000 units (20 per cent of the NHP) 
where variably subsidised land would be sold under a variation of 
conditions to big real estate developers, of which at least 50 per cent 
of the land would be the 63 m2 units as in the Tamlik scheme.13 The 
second private sector scheme, Ebni Beitak (build your own house) was 
geared towards individuals, whereby 89,000 plots (17.8 per cent of the 
NHP) would be sold at subsidised prices with a requirement to build 
a minimum of one loor (a 63 m2 unit) within the irst year, and with a 
maximum of three loors.
Photo 3: Tamlik block in 6th October, Giza. Notice some units are occupied 
despite incomplete roads and landscaping. Y. Shawkat, december 2013.
13. A total of 5,181 feddans (21.8 million m2) were earmarked for the 
scheme. At least 50 per cent of the land was sold at LE 70/m2, or about half 
the LE 140 it cost the government to service with roads and trunk infras-
tructure, while the rest of the land not used for NHP units was sold at LE 
333, which was still below market prices. Developers buying plots over 200 
feddans got further discounts, where the Orascom Community Development 
bought 2,000 feddans for LE 10 per m2 in 6th October City to build Haram 
City. (World Bank 2008). 
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BENCHMARK 1: DOES THE NHP PLAN ANSWER THE 
DEMANDS OF THE ADVERTISED BENEFICIARIES?
Needed units
The centrepiece of the NHP is the 500,000 units headline. Half-
a-million houses. It sounds like a big number, and in many ways it 
is, since the two overlapping programmes before the NHP, the Iskan 
Mubarak lil-Shabab (Mubarak Youth Housing) and Iskan al-Mustaqbal 
(Future Housing) mustered only 140,000 units over a longer time frame, 
or a ifth of the yearly output the NHP hoped to target (15,500 units a 
year, versus 83,000 units a year for the NHP).14 
However, to put these numbers in context, an assessment of the 
scale of demand for low-income housing is needed. Unfortunately, data 
for housing demand is very scant, which is one of the more obvious 
indicators that the NHP was not designed to succeed, at least in terms 
of housing for its advertised beneiciaries. The largest housing demand 
study conducted in Egypt is the Housing Study for Urban Egypt, which 
was released in 2008, a full three years after the NHP had started.15 This 
study clearly states that its igures for demand are not universal, though 
in the absence of any other data, this is the only reference to proclaimed 
housing demand through questionnaires. Projecting its igure of 2.8 
per cent demand among urban households to cover rural household 
demand assuming that rural demand is similar to urban demand –, 
over a ten-year period, the average yearly demand for housing would 
be about 870 thousand units. If we also use the study’s breakdown 
of the reasons behind the demand and focus on the most pertinent 
one, marriage, while excluding other demand reasons like looking for 
a larger unit, that would bring the needed units down to 361 thousand 
a year (41.6 per cent of demanders). Assuming demand is uniform 
across income brackets – which it is not – about 40 per cent could be 
considered low-income – the lowest two income quintiles, poor and 
extremely poor – translating into a target market of 144 thousand units 
a year. Thus the NHP would theoretically manage to cover almost two-
thirds of low-income demand for immediate housing needs, which is a 
considerable contribution.
Tenure Preference
Up until the 1980s, subsidised housing programmes were 
predominantly long term or even lifetime rentals, but since then they 
have become lease-to-own. The NHP attempted to be a little different, 
14. (World Banak 2007).
15.  (USAID, Housing Study for Urban Egypt 2008).
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with an initial mix of 73 per cent ownership units, and 27 per cent 
rental (although the implemented mix is 90 per cent ownership, 10 per 
cent rental). Of the ownership units, a quarter were self-build units, 
while three-quarters of the rental units were small non-family units for 
retirees or widows.
In contrast, a little over half of home demanders in the USAID 
Housing Study preferred rent-to-own tenure, while 43.3 per cent 
were prepared to buy, taking into consideration that these igures are 
averages over the entire income range and are not speciic to low-
income groups, which would probably have more preference for long 
term rental units.
It is also worth noting that the study showed demand for self-build 
land in urban areas to be very low (4.1 per cent), though it may be very 
different in rural areas where people are more used to the process of 
self-building. 
Overall, the programme’s tenure mix doesn’t seem to suit the proile 
of its intended audience, That being said, a considerable number of 
owned NHP units are said to be sub-let by the beneiciaries – illegally.16
Geographical distribution 
Again, historical evidence shows the distorted geographical 
allocation of units. Between 1982 and 2005, Greater Cairo (Cairo, 
Giza and Qalyubia) received 45.8 per cent of all public housing even 
though it housed only 27 per cent of the population.17 
For the NHP, Greater Cairo was again allocated the lion’s share 
of units – 35 per cent – though with a ratio of about 0.032 units per 
family (ig. 2)18. In comparison, much higher ratios were allocated to 
frontier governorates like North Sinai (0.396 units per family), Al-Wadi 
Al-Gadid, (0.249) and the Red Sea (0.176). Though one suspects that 
this relatively high ratio is due more to a Bedouin resettlement policy 
rather than provision of low-income housing.19
The lowest shares of housing were in most Delta governorates 
that had no desert fringes (Gharbeya, 0.001; Kafr al-Sheikh, 0.004; 
and Dakahleya, 0.006), which is understandable, as state owned 
16. (Al-Ahram 2009).
17. (World Bank 2007).
18. There are no publically available documents that reveal the allocation 
of intended or completed units. Hence, these igures are from an author’s 
compilation from various sources of unit allocation by governorate for the 
NHP. The compilation however is about 90 per cent complete and thus not 
comprehensive.
19. A recent newspaper article was headlined “Free Housing for Halayib 
and Shalateen (Red Sea) Residents”, Al Ahram 2013a.
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land (a prerequisite for public housing) is in short supply there, and 
that their share is usually allocated to a New City in another nearby 
governorate.20 However what is not understandable is the low share for 
mostly Upper Egyptian governorates that do have a desert fringe, and 
20. For example, a breakdown of unit distribution for another housing 
scheme shows units in the New City of 10th of Ramadan in Sharkeya, allo-
cated for both the Sharkeya and Gharbeya governorates. 
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also have land allocated to the New Urban Communities Authority 
(NUCA) to build New Cities (Assiut, 0.008; Beni Sweif, 0.012; Qena, 
0.013; and Sohag, 0.014).
This wide variation between governorates that is up to a factor of 
400 (between the highest and lowest share) shows how public funds 
can be easily misallocated in the absence of a thorough geographic 
housing demand analysis, as well as an absence of accountable local 
government and that it is most likely left to either an arbitrary means of 
allocation, or a means that favours certain constituencies.
BENCHMARK 2: HAVE THE NHP UNITS REACHED THEIR 
ADVERTISED BENEFICIARIES?
There are some quantitative regulations that govern the NHP 
allocation process, as well as the speciications of the housing units 
themselves. However, to test how adequate these regulations are, they 
have been compared to the mandate set by the ICESCR on adequate 
housing.21 Besides being a universal benchmark, the ICESCR has also 
been ratiied by Egypt making it part of local law. 
Accessibility and Affordability 
The ICESCR deines accessibility as the meeting of speciic needs of 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups. Therefore, in this section the 
focus is on if the poor were able to beneit from the NHP based on the 
inancial and formal requirements set to qualify for an NHP unit. 
Different literature states that the maximum portion a household should 
spend from its income on all housing related costs (rent or mortgage 
payments, utility bills, maintenance fees and taxes) is between 20 and 
30 per cent. Indeed, in Egypt, where much of a stretched income goes 
towards food, health and education costs, rent-to-income ratios were 
between 15 and 24 per cent of household income, where the poorest 
quintile spent 24 per cent, and the second poorest quintile spent 22.2 
per cent of its income, or between LE 150 and LE 170 (EUR 16 and 18) 
per month respectively.22
21. The right to adequate housing (Art.11 (1)) :. 12/13/1991. CESCR General 
comment 4, note number 8. http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbo
l%29/469f4d91a9378221c12563ed0053547e?Opendocument Signed by 





Economic data at the time shows that the target beneiciaries of low-
income earners, which common sense would have one assume are the 
poorest two quintiles, had household incomes of LE 600 and LE 800 
(EUR 61 and 82) respectively (ig. 3). This meant an instalment or rent-
to-income ratio of 25 per cent of income would be between LE 150 
to LE 200 (EUR 16 and 21) per month. However, the legal deinitions 
of low-income earners used by the NHP are completely off the mark. 
In 2005, when the NHP started, low-income was deined as no more 
than LE 1,000 (EUR 104) for a single earner, or LE 1,500 (EUR 156) 
for a household income, which was raised in 2008 to LE 1,750 (EUR 
182) and LE 2,500 (EUR 260) respectively 23. A minimum income was 
also required for the ownership units at LE 650 (EUR 68) to qualify for 
the required bank loan, or LE 1,200 (EUR 125) for a mortgage. This 
means that the target range of the NHP was the 32nd to 98th income 
percentiles,24 or roughly the top half of the second quintile, all the way 
to the upper levels of the ifth (richest) quintile.
In effect, this meant the exclusion of the bottom 32 per cent of 
earners (most of the second quintile and all of the irst quintile) from all 
but 8 per cent of the units of the implemented NHP. With this, the only 
affordable options were the Awla bel-Re’aya scheme, which rented out 
for anything between LE 60 and LE 125 (EUR 6 and 13) per month 
depending on the whims of the authorities,25 and the Igar family unit 
schemes which rented for between LE 160 and LE 200 (EUR 17 and 21) 
23. As per Mortgage Law number 148 of 2001, article 6, altered by prime 
ministerial decree number 456 of 2005 and then decree 1864 of 2008. 
Though some schemes continued using the 2005 deinition up until 2013.
24. In 2008 households earning LE 2500 per month were in the 98th percen-
tile, (USAID, Housing Study for Urban Egypt 2008).
25. (Al-Ahram, Iskan Hukumi bil-igar 2010) and (Al-Ahram 2013).
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per month.26 However, access to these units was limited as the Awla 
bel-Re’aya were small units of 42 m2 and are not family units. Rather, 
they are intended for retired couples or widows who would normally 
be living off a very modest pension. The other Igar scheme units (an 
acceptable family size of 63 m2) were not available in all governorates 
and represented only 3 per cent of the implemented NHP.
Lower middle-income earners were a little better off, though 
again only in theory. The Tamlik, Dthahir al-Sahrawy and Beit al-‘Aela 
schemes (61 per cent as implemented), required an LE 5,000 (EUR 
521) down payment along with LE 160 (EUR 17) monthly instalments. 
However, to qualify for the required bank loan, a beneiciary must earn 
a minimum of LE 650 (EUR 68) per month,27 which would correspond 
to a household from the middle of the second quintile and up, or a 
single income from an even higher bracket. This took a large portion of 
buyers by surprise as demonstrated by the high rate of default in the irst 
years of the programme.28 To make matters worse, later phases were 
even more expensive where banks and a recently introduced mortgage 
scheme required a minimum income of LE 1080 (EUR 113), thus only 
available for upper-middle income earners and above.29
Even if one could afford these units, accessibility was still theoretical, 
since to qualify for a bank or mortgage loan for the Tamlik units, 
beneiciaries must have had a formal job to act as guarantor towards the 
loan, rendering these inaccessible to almost 40 per cent of the working 
population who have informal jobs.30 A further hurdle was added later 
to the project when the original bank, Al-Ta’meer wal-Iskan, transferred 
all loans to Bank Masr (both of which are state owned), though the 
latter bank demanded a guarantor with a government job, no older 
than 40 years old, not an immediate relative, and who would have his 
or her salary paid directly into the bank on a monthly basis in order to 
26. (Amwal-al-Ghad 2010).
27. An LE 30,000 loan is required from one of the participating state banks, 
where instalments are paid back at a compound appreciation of 7.5 per cent 
over twenty years (Al-Mal 2013).
28. In 2010, only three years after the irst units were delivered, 17,000 
families had started defaulting on loan payments (Ros-al-Youssef, I›faa 17 Alf 
Mota›ather i «Al-Kawmy Lil-Iskan» min fawa›ed al-Ta›kheer 2010).
29. In the later years of the NHP, unit prices were double the original cost 
during 2005, thereby doubling the minimum income to qualify for the loans 
(Al-Borsa 2012) or the mortgages (The Guarantee and Subsidy Fund 2010). 
Mortgages were introduced in 2009/2010 when a World Bank inance 
Affordable Mortgage Programme was introduced and NUCA started selling 
a portion of inished units to the Tamweel al Oula Mortgage Company to sell 
them on to beneiciaries (Al-Masry al-Youm 2010). 
30. Interview with Gamal (only gave irst name), a beneiciary of the Tamlik 
scheme, who said he had to pay the entire amount in cash (kayesh) upfront 
because he did not have a formal job. March, 2013.
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have the value of the instalment deducted automatically.31 This move 
further excluded almost 80 per cent of potential beneiciaries, or as 
was to be expected, opened a black market to rent out government 
employees who would be found lurking outside the bank’s branches 
during application time, offering their ‘services’ for LE 15,000 (EUR 
1,562) per application, or demanding to go into ‘partnership’ with 
the applicant in owning the unit.32 This last amendment however did 
not extend to the mortgage lenders which had a different application 
system, but a much smaller share of the NHP.
The Beit al-‘Aela was just as controversial in its discriminatory 
hurdles, though in a slightly different way. This scheme of more 
attractive two storey units was only made available to male applicants 
from professional syndicates or government agencies who also had to 
prove that their wives had both a college degree and were employed, 
and that they did not have more than two children.33
So what of the remaining third of the NHP? Both private sector-
built schemes were affordable only to the upper-middle and richest 
households from the start. The Ebni Beitak scheme (24.3 per cent as 
implemented), was highly affordable only if you were buying the land 
plot which required an LE 1,050 (EUR 109) down payment, and seven 
yearly payments of LE 1,350 (EUR 140) each. The rules were to build 
a semi-inished unit within a one-year time frame from plot delivery 
(later increased to 15 months), or else risk revocation of the land by 
NUCA.34 Even with an LE 15,000 (EUR 1,562) cash subsidy, it cost 
an average of LE 71,000 (EUR 7,395) to have a liveable unit with a 
inished interior,35 which equals an average of LE 5,733 (EUR 597) per 
month, driving many beneiciaries into debt to inance their units. The 
developer-inanced units of the Mustathmirin scheme (6.6 per cent as 
implemented), required four bulk payments for reservation, signing of 
contract, and delivery, which would total between LE 30,000 and LE 
55,000 (EUR 3,125 and 5,729) within a one-year period, and that is 
after an LE 10,000 (EUR 1,041) subsidy that not everyone qualiied 
for.36 In addition, there would be monthly or quarterly instalments that 
averaged from LE 7,500 (EUR 781) down to LE 1,100 (EUR 115) per 
month for anything between one and ten year payment schemes. It is 
not surprising that upon visiting one of the more mature developments, 
31. For phase four of the NHP from 2010 onwards. (Al-Ahram 2010).
32. (Ros-al-Youssef 2010) and (Al-Dustur al-Asly 2010) and (Al-Ahram 
2010).
33. (Al-Masry al-Yawm 2007).
34. (Nathmy 2012).
35. Permits and utility connections costs, LE 4,150, structural shell, LE 
35,000, exterior inishing, 30,000, interior inishing, LE 16,000 (Nathmy 
2012).
36. According to a price schedule for the “Degla Gardens” development. 
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owners had fenced-in the setbacks of the ground loor units in marble 
clad fences and elaborate iron gates, adding private little gardens to 
their property.37
As if inancial and class hurdles were not enough, the allocation 
process – supposedly an open lottery of beneiciaries that passed the 
screening process – was not transparent and was rife with accusations 
of fraud. On the one hand, it was not properly managed or monitored: 
not even a single digital database was used where it might have been 
possible to ind out if a beneiciary already had a residence; and income 
declarations were rarely or arbitrarily investigated.38 Also, people could 
offer to pay the full amount of the unit in cash, a practice which favoured 
the more wealthy quintiles over the poorer ones, or were forced to do 
so by the authorities upon allocation in contravention with the contract 
which offered a bank loan.39 More blatant forms of cronyism occurred 
where regime parliamentarians were on the lottery and were allocated 
more than one unit,40 or where local authorities allocated previously 
reserved units to other beneiciaries who skipped the queue.41 
Security of tenure
In a 1997 study on the formality of housing, it was found that most 
public housing units were not registered: the older units because they 
were under rent agreements (between tenants and state agencies), 
and more recent rent-to-own units because they had exchanged 
hands a number of times without formal transfer of title.42 Political 
control of tenants of public housing schemes has also been known to 
happen, where all permit authorisations for any change of activity go 
through government ofices, and thus have been allowed or denied 
37. Field visit to the Haram City development, 6th of October City, Giza, 
10.12.2013.
38. As evidenced by numerous protests by applicants calling for a re-run 
of the lottery, which some authorities gave in to (Al-Mesreyun 2012) and 
(al-Yawm al-Sabea 2013), as well as a copy of a contract from a Private 
Developer scheme where the information declaration page was not even 
illed in. Also see (World Bank 2008) for more detail on the faults of the NHP 
screening process and for recommendations for improving it.
39. (ONA 2012) and (Al-Dustur al-Asly 2010).
40. In one case, nine relatives of the local Member of Parliament from the 
National Democratic Party were allocated units, four of which were her own 
children. (Al-Dustor-al-asly 2010) 
41. 740 beneiciaries took the governor of Gharbeya to court over the allo-
cation of units –designated to them after passing the screening and paying the 
registration fee– to other beneiciaries who had not done so and supposedly 
applied at a much later date without being screened. (Al-Mesreyoon 2012)
42. There are regulations that prevent beneiciaries of subsidised housing 
from selling their unit in the open market, though that has not stopped selling 
them informally. See De-Soto 1997. 
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according to the political participation of the tenant in favour of the 
ruling NDP.43
The majority of NHP are ownership schemes (79 per cent as 
planned/ 92 per cent as implemented), inanced under special terms 
from both state-owned banks and mortgage lenders (for the public 
sector schemes) and private ones (for the private sector schemes). In the 
public sector schemes, units are delivered after paying an initial down 
payment, where loans/mortgages are paid back over 20 to 40 years. 
The main setback for bank schemes is that owners are not given the title 
deed to the property, or even a copy, until the full value is paid, while 
running the risk of administrative foreclosure in the case of default on 
payment of an instalment.44 Mortgage loans, though more rare, offer 
a little more security in that the Guarantee and Subsidy Fund (GSF) 
can guarantee missed payments for up to three months. Overall, the 
government has shown some leniency, possibly for political reasons, in 
both 2010 which was a run-up to an election year, when 17,000 tenants 
defaulted on their instalments, and in 2012 when an undocumented 
number defaulted in the wake of the January Revolution and the ruling 
SCAF was looking to quell unrest.45 Leniency took the form of waived 
interest fees on missed instalments as long as the total original value of 
the missed instalments was paid within a certain time frame. However, 
because there are no statistics, it is hard to assess the rate of default-
caused evictions. 
In the private sector Mustathmirin schemes, inancing is provided 
either by the developer – where buyers pay a considerable portion of 
the total value of the unit in instalments that start before the units are 
delivered – or through mortgage companies, where down payments are 
a little lower. Security with developer-inanced projects has been very 
low, where a typical contract reveals that in the event a buyer wished to 
pull out of the scheme, a penalty equal to 10 per cent of the total value 
of the unit will be incurred, this penalty would also be incurred and 
the contract automatically deemed void if an instalment is missed for 
more than 60 days.46 These penalties are also levied even after the unit 
is delivered where the developer reserves the right to evict the buyer in 
43. (Hassan 1985)
44. Administrative custody, or hagz idari, is a procedure where a govern-
ment agency that is owed rent or taxes can impound moveable property 
of a value similar to the money owed to cover the debt. However, there 
is much fraud in this system where government clerks claim there was no 
moveable property to impound, thereby transforming the claim to a felony 
punishable by a prison term. Interview with housing rights lawyer Muhamed 
Abdel-Azim, 23.09.2013.
45.  (Ros-al-Youssef, I’faa 17 Alf Mota›ather i «Al-Kawmy Lil-Iskan» min 
fawa’ed al-Ta’kheer 2010) and (Al-Tahrir-al-Yawm 2012). 




the event he or she violates the rules of the re-sale of their unit to a third 
party, one of which stipulates a fee equal to 10 per cent of the value of 
the unit “for administrative purposes”. Again, mortgage schemes offer 
some more security, as low-income mortgages are covered by the GSF, 
and for the time being as lending is only 25 per cent of income, risk 
of default is lower than in countries that were affected by the 2008 
mortgage crisis.47
Beneiciaries could, however, buy their security by purchasing a unit 
outright, though this method favours higher income earners who could 
provide enough cash up front, and is not wholly legal as per NHP rules. 
The two rental schemes of the NHP are allocated under different 
conditions. The Awla bel-Ri’aya were on medium-term lengths of ive 
to seven years, with annual increases of 7 per cent, after which the 
tenant would give up the unit, as the Ministry of Housing foresees that 
as a long enough period for the tenant’s income to have grown and 
thus the need for a subsidised rental unit to have ceased.48 This seems 
to be a very precarious situation, as most of the renters are supposed 
to be widows or retirees – as mandated by the application for these 
units – who have little if any foreseeable increase in their incomes. A 
minority of Igar scheme units though have life-long contracts as per the 
old-rent law.49
Another rental phenomena that should be mentioned here is the 
informal subletting of ownership units – which were bought or acquired 
for investment/speculation purposes as outlined in the previous section. 
Here tenants have very precarious tenure as no formal leases are signed 
since beneiciaries of subsidised units are not allowed to rent them 
out under the pretext that they themselves were in need of the units 
for personal use and not as an investment. There has always existed 
an informal rental market for public units and the NHP is no different 
where samasra – brokers, or middlemen – have set up shop in most of 
the inhabited clusters, where ‘beneiciaries’ have put them in charge of 
their units to rent them out, collect the rent, and even evict tenants at a 
moment’s notice if a suitable offer to buy was made.50
47. This may change soon however, as the mortgage companies and the 
GSF are pressuring to raise the lending limit to 40 per cent, which will greatly 
increase risk of default.
48. (Al-Ahram 2013).




Habitability, physical accessibility and cultural adequacy
According to the ICESCR, habitability is deined as the provision of 
adequate space and the protection from climate and structural hazards. 
Physical accessibility means that disabled people and the elderly are 
able to access their apartments. Cultural adequacy takes into account 
expressions of cultural identity. By combining these three indicators, 
we can establish a baseline for crowding and spatial needs that is 
contextualised for average Egyptian requirements. 
The Egyptian Building Code stipulates a minimum space requirement 
of 7.5 m2 per habitable room, be it a living space or a bedroom (ig. 4), 
which is extremely low. By comparison, London standards, which are 
not known for providing generous apartments, are 7 m2 for a single 
occupancy room, and 12.5 m2 for a double occupancy, and 20 m2 for a 
living space that holds four people. 
In terms of space, the two bedroom units for widows or retired 
couples (Awla bel-Re’aya, 5 per cent of the NHP) with a net area of 
37 m2 allows them to barely conform to the Egyptian code, but the 
bedrooms are 40 per cent smaller than the London code, while the 
living room is quite small for a family. The two-bedroom family units for 
all the other NHP schemes, with a net area of 54 m2, are generous by 
Egyptian code standards, but the second bedroom misses the London 
code by 15 per cent.
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However, area isn’t everything. When viewed in light of crowding 
standards, smaller units are acceptable if their occupants are a retired 
couple with no children living with them. For younger widows, who 
in all probability have children, the Awla bel-Re’aya units prove 
too small. The larger units are just about acceptable for the average 
Egyptian family of four but in social health terms, having one small 
bedroom for two children of different sexes is a serious issue for an 
older family.51 
As the age target for the NHP beneiciaries was between 20 and 40 
years, there should have been larger three-bedroom units of about 73 
m2 (net area 64 m2) on offer, to accommodate more mature families. 
There should also have been an option where smaller families who 
beneitted from the NHP, can apply to move to larger units that come 
on offer in later phases of programmes, thus freeing up their smaller 
units to new younger families. 
In terms of structural safety, a number of reports indicate failures in 
different schemes involving thousands of units, some of which were 
vacant or others that required evacuation.52 
Physical accessibility, as with almost all buildings in Egypt is 
a recurring issue. In the NHP most buildings are walk ups with no 
elevators, but do have units on the ground loor making about 17 per 
cent of them accessible to fully and partially disabled people, and to 
older people (Assuming that the average height of NHP buildings is ive 
to six storeys). Again this is only in theory as there is no formal structure 
by which a person requiring a ground loor unit can apply for one 
speciically, while the units are allotted by (arbitrary) lottery.53 
Availability of services, materials and infrastructure
All unit schemes were supposed to be delivered with their 
infrastructure hooked up, though not necessarily with inished interiors. 
Infrastructure for the Ebni Beitak scheme was supposed to be in place 
within the irst year of plot delivery, as buyers completed the ground 
loor units. Entire phases of public housing projects that preceded the 
51. (Gray 2001).
52. 12,638 units in Minya (Al-Masry-al-Yawm 2010) 620 units in Dumyat 
experienced settlement and tilting (Al-Yawm-al-Sabe›a 2010) and 18 buil-
dings in Bani-Sweif experienced cracks (Al-Masry-al-Yawm 2009), while a 
unit collapsed and a number of others experienced cracks in the private 
developer scheme of Haram City (Shehayeb and Abdel-Halim 2013). 1,900 
units was also evacuated in al-Beheira (Al-Ahram 2013).
53. Nowhere on the application form is there a question for preference, 
especially one based on age or needs. One example of lottery fraud is where 
the sequence was changed to favour certain people against others. (Al-Wafd, 
Mahazil tawzi›a shuqaq al-iskan bi-Dusuq 2011).
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NHP have stood empty for close to a decade because of incomplete 
infrastructure, so was the NHP any different? 
The answer is no, as tens of thousands of units – both allocated 
to beneiciaries and unallocated – have already stood empty for a 
number of years. The Ebny Beitak scheme fared the worst, as water 
and electricity infrastructure did not reach most phases for four years, 
rendering the personal life-savings invested in the units useless, forcing 
the beneiciaries to, incur additional costs renting out apartments in the 
interim.54 
The self-build scheme also came up against price hikes in material 
costs, with steel increasing by 40 per cent, causing a steep rise in 
construction costs in addition to the payment of ‘protection’ fees to 
local thugs to keep materials from being stolen.55
In addition, around 30,000 units from public sector schemes still 
have no infrastructure at least two years after they were completed.56
Location
One of the major problems with the NHP is the choice of mostly 
remote desert locations for the 67 per cent of schemes built in New 
Cities.57 Since the NHP must be built on state owned land, the low 
value outskirts were chosen, which are known for their low level or 
lack of services, leading to a high vacancy rate as low-income families 
ind it dificult to live there.58
In a few NHP schemes I visited in 6th October and Badr cities, on 
the fringes of Greater Cairo, there were no regular means of public 
transport, and the owners I did meet had private cars. To put this in 
perspective, the 2008 Egypt Demographic Survey showed that only 7.3 
per cent of households owned a car.59
54. Interviews with Ramone and Mohamed (gave irst names only) during a 
ield visit to Ebny Beitak, 7th Phase, 6th October City, March, 2013.
55. (Nathmy 2012).
56. (Sada al-Balad 2013).
57. Where 67 per cent of land was allocated to New Cities, and the rest was 
located within city and village boundaries in governorates. (Al-Ahram, Bi 
sabab al-tagawozat wal-samsara wa irtifa›a al-as›ar, al-mashru›a al-qawmy 
lil-sikan i daerat al-gadal 2009).
58. There exists no regulation to designate certain percentages of land for 
public housing, while almost no funds are allocated to land purchases for 
public service projects (World-Bank 2008).
59. (Al-Zanaty and Way 2009).
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BENCHMARK 3: IMPLEMENTING THE NHP
How many units were built?
The original plan for the NHP was to build 500,000 units in a six 
year period between September 2005 and September 2011, Mubarak’s 
six year term. It was already viewed by experts as too ambitious given 
the historic rate of production of such schemes (about 17,000 units per 
year), and given the lack of preparation and planning before the start 
date to signiicantly raise that igure four fold to an annual average of 
83,000 units. 
The government though, wasn’t going to build all 500,000 units 
since public sector agencies (NUCA, governorates, and the Awqaf) 
were going to build 311,000 units between them – roughly 51,000 
units a year – while the private sector would build 189,000 units – at 
31,500 units per year (Figure 5).
In the end, public sector agencies averaged 34,000 units per year 
over the initial six year NHP timeline, roughly double the rate of 
previous programmes, but by completing only 203,453 units it met a 
mere 65 per cent of the target.60 As per a MoH report dated October 
2012,61 and given a full additional year to the September 2011 deadline, 
albeit a year where government was still dysfunctional in the wake of 
the January 2011 revolution, the 500,000 units target had still not been 
met.
The public sector schemes missed their collective target by 15 per 
cent, where the rental schemes were the biggest underachievers, with 
only a third of the intended target built, while the ownership schemes 
exceeded their targets by 12 per cent.
The private sector schemes fared much worse than the public sector 
schemes, reaching less than two-thirds of their target. Although, of the 
two schemes, the self-build Ebny Beitak scheme actually exceeded 
60. A statistics report with aggregated data from all public sector schemes of 
low-cost housing, iskan iqtisadi, covering the original years of the NHP, 2005 
to 2011 was used for this igure (CAPMAS 2012).
61. As opposed to the aggregated CAPMAS 2012, this MoH report (MoH 
2012) disaggregates the number of implemented units by scheme. However, 
the only date indicated for this report was in the url of the pdf document 
retrieved from the MoH website. Otherwise, the table that shows the units 
implemented is undated, and an aggregated table showing a year-by-year 
account of implemented units states that the sixth and last year started on 1st 
October, 2010 and extends till ‘now’. Thus it has been assumed that ‘now’ is 
14th October, 2013. 
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its target by about 5 per cent,62 while the big developer Mustathmirin 
scheme managed a mere 25 per cent of its target despite heavily 
subsidised land and direct subsidies to the developers. What has 
become of the subsidised land sold to these private developers is still 
an unresolved issue, especially that regime supporters were the prime 
beneiciaries of this scheme.63
How many units are usable?
The question of habitability brought up in the irst part of this essay 
implies that the number of units built does not mean much if they are 
not useable, or if usable units are not lived in. 
Egypt on a whole does have a vacancy problem, with the most recent 
statistics showing 30 per cent – or a staggering 7.7 million – units 
empty, over half of which have not been completed.64 The NHP is 
no exception. During the security vacuum in the wake of the January 
62. As per the MoH report (MoH 2012) which relied on plots delivered 
rather than plots built. Though a study conirms a high rate of completion 
(Nathmy 2012), where a 2,200 plot sample revealed that 92 per cent com-
pleted a single loor/unit, 87 per cent completed two loors (two units) each, 
and 62 per cent building all three loors. So it might be safe to assume that 
the scheme met its 89,000 unit target, and more.
63. A former NDP parliamentarian’s real estate irm, Memaar Al Morshedy 
acquired 600 feddans in 6th October City or about 12 per cent of all land 
allocated to the scheme (Degla Group 2013) & (Degla Group 2013).
64. For an in-depth analysis of this phenomenon see Shawkat, 2013.
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25th Revolution, thousands of empty government housing units were 
stormed and squatted in by people, where a lot of these units were from 
projects that even pre-dated the NHP.65
So why were all these units empty? Based on newspaper reports, 
most were completed or nearly completed units but had not yet been 
allocated, while another portion had been allocated to beneiciaries, 
but either due to incomplete infrastructure, lack of services or security, 
or possibly due to speculation, they had not yet moved into them.66 
One of the main reasons that may have kept these units empty is the 
fact that thousands of them still have incomplete infrastructure, and 
hence have not been delivered or beneiciaries have refused to accept 
them.67
Another reason is that units were too expensive for the applicants, 
and just stood unsold.68 In fact, over the six year course of the NHP 
the costs of the units doubled, showing that even subsidised housing 
schemes were not immune from the real estate bubble that free-market 
housing experienced at the time, much to the beneit of the steel and 
cement industry where NDP members had controlling stakes.69 
A third reason, in the case of the village unit scheme Qura al-
Dthahir al-Sahrawy, is that most of these desert units were meant to 
have land allocated to them for reclamation, but in the four years after 
their completion this land had not been readied, rendering the homes 
useless for the farmers who had applied for them.70
65. 1,800 units in Beit al-‘ela (Al-Masry al-Yawm 2011), 232 units in Haram 
City (Al-Ahram 2011), 650 in Beheira, (Al-Wafd, Al-Mi›at yahtalun shuqaq 
Mubarak bil-Beheira 2011), 400 in Alexandria, another 400 in Qalyub, 
(Al-Wafd 2011), 144 in Aswan (Al-Ahram 2013), and an unspeciied number 
of units in Minya (Masrawy 2011).
66. A ield visit to a portion the scheme inished three years earlier showed 
that a portion of the 5,400 completed units were delivered to beneiciaries, 
and where middlemen had already set up shop and were renting and tra-
ding them, while an even lesser portion seemed inhabited. Field visit by the 
author to 11 clusters in the Ganub al-Ahya’ sector, 6th of October City, Giza, 
10.12.2013.
67. A recent report to the housing minister stated 21,000 units from the NHP 
still had no infrastructure (Al-Ahram 2013).
68. A number of governorates reported extremely low demand in the irst 
year of the NHP due to high prices (Al-Masry al-Yawm 2006) and (Al-Masry 
al-Yawm 2006), also see previous section on affordability and access. 
69. Ahmed Ezz, a former high level NDP member and head of the parlia-
mentary budget committee during tenure as an NDP MP, controlled between 






By October 2012, a full year after the original deadline of the NHP, 
a little over three-quarters of the 500,000 unit target had been met, 
where a third of them were built using private money. While at the 
outset this seemed like a signiicant contribution to urban housing, the 
NHP missed all of its social targets.
In terms of providing affordable housing to low-income families 
(those of the bottom two income quintiles) the NHP ignored its 
advertised target. The units most suited to the poorest income quintile, 
the rental Igar, Awla bel-Reaya and Beit al-‘Aela, constituted less than 
a tenth of the total completed units even though they were supposed 
to constitute double that igure. Meanwhile, a full 60 per cent of the 
programme was theoretically affordable for only the top half of the 
second income quintile and up. This is because it excluded all those 
who have informal jobs and embedded middle-income government 
employees, NDP parliamentarians, governors into the allocation system 
–allowing these regime supporters to proiteer as middlemen between 
those who did not meet NHP criteria–, and investor/speculators, all 
proiting from a well-below-market-price unit that could be sub-let or 
‘lipped’ once the resale price was right. The remaining third of the 
NHP was affordable only to the richest earners.
This massive redistribution of public subsidy to the undeserving was 
made possible by un-transparent and arbitrary allocation procedures 
and a legal deinition of ‘low-income’ that completely ignored 
economic data, hence, deceiving the public in to believing that the 
NHP was affordable to the poor. 
In terms of providing useable and liveable housing to its advertised 
target beneiciaries, there was a lot left to be desired from the NHP. 
Despite the completion of about 380,000 units, infrastructure non-
delivery rendered a signiicant portion of them unusable, while faulty 
construction meant a considerable number of NHP blocks suffered 
structural damage within months of being completed. These are stark 
indicators that there was never any real money or capacity to complete 
the well-advertised target of half a million units, where behind endless 
freshly painted facades hid thousands of unusable or unsafe apartments. 
For those that did end up living in NHP units, life could be much 
better. While political reasons keep risk of evictions low for formal 
owners, a risk does remain. This risk is much higher for tenants of the 
informally sublet ownership units. Formal rental units also carry a risk 
of eviction especially given the precarious nature of the intended “more 
vulnerable” beneiciaries. Habitability was another concern as the 63 
m2 units were still small for a typical Egyptian family in that income 
bracket, while the smaller 42 m2 units are just outright inadequate for 
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beneiciary families of these units. Physical accessibility and location 
of the units were also of concern as very few if no provisions were 
made for the disabled, while the remote locations coupled with the 
absence of public transportation made access almost impossible for 
those without a private car. Personal security is another major concern.
So who did the NHP beneit? For one, pictures of Mubarak, 
governors, and other oficials handing over deeds to beneiciaries illed 
the front pages of newspapers for a few years and kept up the hopes of 
hundreds of thousands of families for affordable housing. The regime 
also capitalised on the NHP in the government report to the ICESCR, 
citing its efforts to fulil its obligation towards the right to adequate 
housing, and was touted in the 2010 UNDP Human Development 
Report as realising the dreams of Egypt’s youth.
With the knowledge that expert advice was delivered at the top 
levels of government on important social justice issues like subsidy 
leakage and the screening of potential beneiciaries, and with this 
empirical study on the actual beneiciaries, the main driver behind the 
NHP seems to have been political gain. 
As the uninished schemes of the NHP muddled on in the two years 
after the revolution that toppled Mubarak’s regime, the ensuing regimes 
– the irst interim military period ruled over by the SCAF, the year of 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rule, and the second interim military period 
of post June 30th, 2013 – continued using the same un-transparent 
allocation processes and deceiving legal deinitions for ‘low-income’ 
to allocate the remaining units. Furthermore, mortgage companies are 
calling for raising the already deceiving ‘low-income’ limit for affordable 
mortgages to LE 4,000 (EUR 417),71 while during MB tenure, the GSF 
has put in a request to raise the loan-to-income ratio to a potentially 
devastating 40 per cent instead of the current 25 per cent, and seems 
set to be allowed to do so by the next elected parliament. It remains 
to be seen whether litigation on the back of a new constitution that 
outlines adequate housing as one of the government’s responsibilities, 
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